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Abstract: Does water scarcity induce conflict? And who would engage in a water scarcity 
conflict? In this paper we look for evidence of the relation between water scarcity and 
conflictive behavior. With a framed field experiment conducted with smallholder irrigators 
from semi-arid Tanzania that replicates appropriation from an occasionally scarce common 
water flow we assess what type of water users is more inclined to react in conflictive way to 
scarcity. On average, water scarcity induces selfish appropriation behavior in the experiment 
which is regarded as conflictive in the Tanzanian irrigator communities where strong non-
competition norms regulate irrigation water distribution. But not all react to water scarcity in 
the same way. Poor, marginalized, dissocialized irrigators with low human capital and with 
higher stakes are most likely to react with conflictive appropriation behavior to water scarcity. 
Viewed from a political ecology perspective we conclude that circumstances in Tanzania are 
conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. Water scarcity and water values are increasing, and 
water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements. Moreover, a higher likelihood to 
react in a conflictive way to water scarcity coincides with real economic and political 
inequalities which could form a basis for mobilization for more violent ways of competing for 
scarce resources.   
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Introduction 
Conflicts over water have been the centre of attention for some time. Not only has a future of inter 
state water wars been forecasted, also  the internal, civil conflicts that mark the last decennia have been 
linked to an increasing scarcity of natural resources like water or cropland (Starr 1991, UNDP 2006, 
Homer-Dixon 1994, Kaplan 1994, Le Billon 2001, Welsch 2008). While the literature provides bits 
and pieces of the answer on how resource scarcity and conflict relate, there is no evidence of the 
relation between resource scarcity and the individual predisposition for conflictive behavior. This 
study will provide such evidence by making use of a framed field experiment, conducted with 
irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania, which replicates water appropriation dilemmas in common water 
flows under circumstances of water scarcity. We assume that water users who are more likely to react 
to scarcity in a conflictive way in the experiment may also be more inclined to resort to more violent 
ways of competing for scarce resources if other circumstances conducive to conflict would arise. It is 
therefore particularly relevant to look for behavioral evidence of the relation between water scarcity 
and conflict and to assess who is more likely to engage in water scarcity conflicts. Evaluating these 
findings from a political ecology perspective allows gauging the potential of water scarcity conflicts in 
this setting.  
Literature on the relation between resource scarcity and conflict  
The relation between resource scarcity and conflict has been amply debated in the literature. We give 
an overview. The environmental security literature states there is a causal relation between scarcity of 
natural resources and violent conflict and predicts resource scarcity conflicts are on the rise 5 . 
Increasing scarcity of resources is expected not only to provoke internal or interstate conflicts, but also 
to induce large population movements which will feed group identity conflicts. It may deepen 
economic deprivation and disrupt social institutions and contribute to deprivation conflicts (Homer-
Dixon 1994). Besides, resource scarcity is more likely to lead to violent conflict if an inability to solve 
                                                     
5 Natural resources like water, cropland, forests and fish are diffuse, not lootable and renewable resources with a low 
marginal value but a high total value because they are essential for humans and the biosphere. When it concerns this type of 
resources, scarcity makes its value (Le Billon, 2001). 
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complex problems aggravates grievances and erodes the moral and coercive authority of government 
(Homer-Dixon 1999). Yet, the environmental security literature has been criticized for being too 
deterministic and a-political, for generalizing too much and for being based on anecdotal evidence 
which suffers from a selection bias as it is mainly based on cases where resource scarcity and conflicts 
coincide (Gleditsch 2001, Le Billon 2001). 
The common pool resource (CPR) literature also deals with the relation between resource scarcity and 
conflict. Actually, it has proven that institutions hold the potential to overcome distributive conflicts 
and overuse (Ostrom 1990). The CPR literature, however, is criticized for oversimplification as it sees 
scarcity as a likely cause of competitive struggles if unconstrained by proper institutions.  But because 
of its focus on cooperation it does not suffer from selection bias (Turner 2004). For instance, in the 
politically instable Somali Region in Ethiopia where drought causes environmental scarcity, farmers 
and pastoralist have a non-violent relationship because farmers and pastoralists have adopted different 
institutions for sharing scarce resources (Bogale and Korf 2007). Another example involves the 
relatively peaceful sharing of increasingly scarce salmon stocks in the Coastal Salish Fisheries in the 
US with the aid of an adapted and flexible set of institutions for governing fish appropriation 
(Singleton 2007).  
Apart from case studies on cooperation or conflict in circumstances where CPR are scarce, this strand 
of literature also includes analyses of CPR users’ behavior based on laboratory or field experiments 
(e.g. Cardenas and Carpenter 2004, Cardenas 2003). Few experimental studies however look at the 
effect of resource scarcity on behavior. Exceptions include Rutte et al. (1987) who conducted an 
experiment with students using a one shot game simulating sequential CPR appropriation and who 
found that subjects harvested less from the resource in scarcity than in abundance conditions, 
especially when scarcity was nature-induced. De Kwaadsteniet et al. (2006) conducted an experiment 
with students and found that subjects are guided by the equal division rule if there is resource size 
certainty.  But ‘proself’ oriented subjects appropriate more ‘prosocially’ oriented ones. Osés-Eraso and 
Viladrich-Grau (2007) use an experiment with students in which subjects first choose between 
extracting or not from a CPR stock after which the remaining resource units are shared. Resource 
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scarcity is replicated by reducing the initial resource stock. They show that appropriation levels 
diminish with increasing CPR scarcity which they attribute to subjects’ concern for resource scarcity.  
Political ecology scholars however argue that causes of resource conflicts may be much more complex 
than competitive struggles over scarce resources6. Resource conflicts may be rooted in history, broader 
social tensions or disagreements over ethical issues like proper resource use.  Moreover, the forms of 
access to and control over resources that depend on culture, social construction, power and political 
economy may shape processes of exclusion or engender competitive struggles (Le Billon 2001, Peluso 
and Watts 2001, Turner 2004). The Kilosa killings in Tanzania, for instance, cannot be solely 
explained by a competitive struggle over scarce resources between farmers and pastoralists 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2009). Underlying is an historical and ongoing spatial and political 
marginalization of pastoralists in favor of farmers. Additionally, a culture of clientilism and corruption 
have eroded trust in the local government and have reduced the willingness of local judiciary and 
police to prevent conflicts.  
The political ecology literature urges to take other contextual factors into account when studying the 
relation between resource scarcity and violent conflict. This brings us to the literature that concentrates 
on civil conflict and its drivers. First, marginalization contributes to a higher incidence of civil conflict 
and a higher likelihood that individuals or groups will participate in violence. Groups may be 
mobilized to join in violence on grounds of real or constructed group inequalities. This is most 
effective if differences in economic opportunities - such as differential access to water - or political 
marginalization coincide with cultural, ethnic or religious differences (Stewart 2000). Exclusion from 
access and control over natural resources can be an additional contributing factor (Benjaminsen et al. 
2009, Turner 2004). 
The second line of thinking asserts that joining in conflict is the result of cost-benefit considerations. 
While participating in acts of violence or supporting armed groups may imply high individual costs 
(death, injury, imprisonment and so on.), people may still choose to participate because of the 
                                                     
6 Resource conflicts or resource-related conflicts are social conflicts (violent or nonviolent) associated with both struggles to 
gain access to natural resources and struggles resulting from the use of natural resources (Turner 2004: 864). 
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potential gains, such as improved socio-economic opportunities, access to valuable assets or loot 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Keen 1998). The gains however may consist of protection or the 
fulfillment of basic economic needs as well (Justino 2009). Therefore, high levels of poverty may 
drive individuals into conflict especially when productive activities are scarce, unemployment is high 
and returns from agriculture work are low (Justino 2009). Those with poorer economic opportunities– 
the poor, the uneducated, the jobless, the landless, the dissocialized, the youth - are more likely to join 
criminal groups or rebel activity because they have nothing to loose but all to gain (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). Oppositely, not participating may be particularly costly because it raises suspicion or 
it excludes one from protection by armed groups and access to resources they control. Such costs may 
render it impossible to stay out (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). 
Thirdly, power determines the distribution of access to key resources and the potential to safeguard 
basic political, economic and social rights. Vulnerability and powerlessness result often from a 
political and economic process of neglect, exclusion or exploitation. Attention for power relations is 
therefore essential when studying resource scarcity conflicts and its underlying causes (Le Billon et al. 
2000). Moreover, power may influence the inclination to conflictive behavior. Powerful individuals 
generally display less behavioral inhibition, they pay less attention to others and may exploit their 
power which makes it more likely they act in a self-interested way and transgress social norms 
(Keltner et al. 2003, Van Kleef et al. 2006). 
At a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals’ behavior and their interactions with their 
immediate surroundings (Verwimp et al. 2009). While the literature tries to explain how incidences of 
conflict relate to resource scarcity, there is little evidence of the relation between the individual 
predisposition for conflictive behavior and water scarcity. This study will provide such evidence by 
making use of a framed field experiment, conducted with irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania, which 
replicates water appropriation dilemmas in common water flows under circumstances of water scarcity. 
More particularly, we want to know who is more inclined to engage in water scarcity conflicts. Three 
subsequent questions will guide our analysis. First, does water scarcity induce a reduction of 
extraction (the CPR thesis) or does it introduce competition (the resource scarcity conflict thesis)? 
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Secondly, what is the profile of those that react with conflictive behavior to water scarcity? Are these 
the marginalized, the dissocialized, the poor, those with low human capital, those with little to loose or 
much to gain as the conflict literature presumes? Thirdly, individuals who are more inclined to react 
with conflictive appropriation behavior to water scarcity may be the ones that are more easily 
convinced to resort to more violent ways of competing for scarce resources if water scarcity would 
coincide with other factors conducive to violent conflict. That is why we will conclude by putting our 
findings in a political ecology perspective and evaluate to what extent circumstances in Tanzania are 
such that resource scarcity could engender violent conflict?  
Research design  
We study the effect of water scarcity on conflictive behavior in smallholder irrigation schemes in 
Tanzania where irrigation water is a seasonally scarce CPR principally governed by the user 
communities. The selected five irrigation schemes are located in the Rufiji river basin in the semi-arid 
low land areas of Mufindi district, Iringa region, Tanzania. Strong non-competition and reciprocity 
norms are essential tools for regulating the distribution of the common water flow in these irrigator 
communities. Yet some defy the norms and enter into appropriative competition with others. This 
however is badly looked upon and considered to be conflictive behavior. Disputes over water arise 
regularly, yet violent conflicts over water have been largely absent (Lecoutere et al. forthcoming).  
We assume that users whom are more inclined to enter into appropriative competition when water is 
scarce despite the existence of non-competition norms would also be more easily convinced to engage 
in more violent ways of competing for scarce resources. And we want to know what characterizes 
these users. we use two types of data: data on irrigators’ behavior in a framed field experiment and 
data on the irrigators’ individual characteristics and their relative power status in their community.  
The framed field experiment was designed to replicate real life dilemmas irrigators face when they 
appropriate water from a common water flow in circumstances of water abundance and of water 
scarcity. Appropriation from a common water flow is sequential and entails vertical downstream 
externalities (Cardenas et al. 2008). Consequently, appropriation does not necessarily affect the 
resource stock but mainly affects the remaining resource units for subsequent user(s). Furthermore, 
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scarcity is not just a reduction of resource units per head but essentially entails there is an insufficient 
supply of resource units to fulfill the users’ needs (UNDP, 2006:133). That is why our design differs 
from other experiments that replicate CPR dilemmas where the underlying concern is resource 
provision and where resource scarcity affects appropriation behavior because resource stocks are more 
rapidly depleted (e.g. Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau 2007). 
The dilemma in appropriation from common water flows with spatially fixed appropriators can be 
mimicked by a repeated dictator game. In the experiment, a participant who is randomly assigned an 
upstream water user is the ‘proposer’ and repeatedly determines a split of the available resource units. 
More specifically, she decides during how many hours to extract irrigation water from an available 12 
hours. This is indicated on card that is passed on to the participant assigned downstream water user 
who is permanently paired to the upstream user. The downstream user is the ‘responder’ who receives 
the remainder. In reality however the downstream user is not a passive receiver. Hence, the ability to 
remain silent, to communicate appreciation, to communicate dissatisfaction or to call for a punishment 
through a mediator have been included. The latter implies a minor cost for the downstream user and a 
small fine for the upstream user. The downstream user’s reaction is indicated on the same card that 
goes back to the upstream user. Thereafter, the subsequent round starts and the upstream user decides 
on water extraction another time and a new card goes to the downstream user for reaction, and so on. 
Participants were not informed about the number of rounds. 
To asses the effect of water scarcity on appropriation behavior, the experiment includes five rounds in 
which water is abundant and ten rounds in which water is scarce. Under water abundance, total water 
availability is sufficient for both up- and downstream user to reach a threshold - set at four hours - that 
represents a critical water input required for irrigated agricultural production. Above the threshold 
payoffs rise with hours of water extracted; below the threshold payoffs are minimal. Water scarcity is 
mimicked by fixing the threshold at seven hours which renders it impossible for both up- and 
downstream users to reach above threshold payoffs. In addition payoffs per hour of water extraction 
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are lower and increase only half as fast per extra hour. Information on payoffs per hours of water was 
available to up- and downstream users7.  
At the end of the experiment, each participant received the sum of payoffs minus mediator fines or 
mediator costs if any. On average participants received 2460 TSH (=1.37 USD). In total, 13 sessions 
of the experiment were organized, each with a maximum of 14 randomly selected participants of the 
same irrigation scheme. 
Secondly, we conducted an individual survey of 228 irrigators randomly selected from each of the five 
irrigation schemes, including all that participated in the experiment. The survey included questions on 
socio-economic characteristics, on networks and social capital, on irrigated agricultural production and 
on conflicts over irrigation water. Additionally, a participatory ranking exercise was organized to get a 
measure of irrigators’ relative power status in the irrigation community based on the community 
members’ perception (Laws et al. 2003). Social status - a strong positive correlate and a more 
commonly understood and unambiguous concept - was used as a proxy for power status8. In each of 
the five irrigation schemes, four randomly composed mixed groups ranked the irrigators who were 
identified on participatory drawn maps by putting irrigators’ name cards on a ladder with four rungs. 
High (low) rungs represented high (low) social status. Each of the four rankings per irrigator was 
transformed into a score, equal to the value assigned to the rung – one to the lowest rung, four to the 
highest - divided by the number of rungs on the ladder. The mean of scores makes up our measure of 
irrigator’s relative social status i.e. relative power status.  
Finally, to put our findings into a larger, political ecology perspective, we discuss trends that drive up 
competition over water in Tanzania and potential exclusionary features of water governance 
institutions on the basis of secondary sources. Additionally, we assess inequalities in wealth, income 
                                                     
7 All tools used both figures and symbols to ensure understanding by lowly educated people. Tools and instructions can be 
obtained on request. 
8 Social status is a collective judgment of the relative position of an individual in society based on her traits and assets and is 
an important source of power (Weiss and Fershtman 1998).  
‘Hadhi ya jamii’ (status in society) and ‘uwezo’ (ability: economic ability but also ability to attain one’s goals, to influence 
others) were used as Swahili translations for social status.   
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opportunities, power, water or land access at the irrigation scheme level with the survey data and at the 
regional level by using National Sample Census of Agriculture 2002/2003 data (URT 2006).  
Empirical results 
In this section we will first discuss appropriation behavior in the experiment when water is abundant 
and the change in behavior when it becomes scarce. Thereafter, we will sketch a profile of who reacts 
with conflictive appropriation behavior to water scarcity by linking different responses to water 
scarcity to individual characteristics of the irrigators who participated in the experiment.  
The framed field experiment consists of repeated dictator game. In fact, if (common knowledge of) 
narrow material self-interest is assumed, the only pure strategy equilibrium of the game would consist 
of the upstream user maximizing her payoff by appropriating all of the available water units. Yet such 
equilibrium has been refuted. Actually, the average proposed shares in dictator games range between 
0.31 and 0.5 and are generally large in small-scale communities where strong egalitarian norms prevail 
(Camerer 2003, Henrich et al. 2004). Moreover, we framed the experiment and participants face 
dilemmas they know from real life. Therefore we expect social norms and social proximity, which are 
known to counter excessive extraction in CPR settings, will enhance fair behavior (Velez et al. 2009).  
In the five rounds in which water is abundant in the experiment the average proposed share by the 78 
upstream users is 0.52. This corresponds to appropriation of less than half of the available hours of 
water, i.e. 5.73 hours (SD 2.01). This ‘more than fair’ behavior is probably motivated by the strong 
norms of non-competition that regulate water use in these irrigation schemes.  
Introducing water scarcity, on the one hand, could induce competitive, selfish extraction behavior. 
This is what the thesis of resource scarcity conflicts would predict. On the other hand, the CPR thesis 
states that communities can overcome distributive conflicts over scarce resources with a suitable set of 
institutions. In line with this thesis Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau (2007) and Rutte et al. (1987) have 
observed a reduction in CPR extraction in response to resource scarcity in their experiments.  
Yet, in our experiment, irrigators do not reduce appropriation in response to water scarcity. The 
average proposed share in the ten rounds of water scarcity drops to 0.45. On average upstream users 
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now appropriate more than half of the available hours, i.e. 6.57 hours (SD 1.87). This is significantly 
more than under water abundance. Thus, in line with the resource scarcity conflict thesis and despite 
the strong non-competition norms regulating CPR use, water scarcity induces selfish appropriation 
behavior, which is considered conflictive appropriation behavior in these communities.  
However, not all upstream users react to water scarcity in the same way. Actually, if we compare 
average appropriation levels under water abundance and water scarcity, we find that 28.21% of 78 
upstream users react with conflictive appropriation to water scarcity by increasing from non-selfish to 
selfish appropriation levels (table 1: AVG). If we evaluate the shock effect of water scarcity by 
comparing the last abundance round (round 5) with the first scarcity round (round 6), we find that 
37.18% reacts with conflictive appropriation to water scarcity (table 1: R5R6). Only a limited number 
of upstream users reduce from selfish appropriation levels in abundance to non-selfish levels in 
scarcity (AVG:3.85%; R5R6:7.69%). Others permanently behave in a selfish and conflictive way 
whether water is abundant or scarce. A relatively high proportion remains non-competitive throughout 
and appropriates in a non-selfish way (AVG:34.62%; R5R6:37.18%).  
Reaction to water scarcity: Comparing hours appropriated in water abundance and water scarcity 
  
Conflictive 
reaction 
Permanently 
conflictive 
Reduce 
Permanently 
non-
competitive 
Comparing averages 28.21% 33.33% 3.85% 34.62% 
Comparing last abundance round (R5) with first scarcity round (R6) 37.18% 17.95% 7.69% 37.18% 
Table 1: Percentage of upstream users per type of reaction to water scarcity (N=78) 
Water scarcity clearly induces different reactions among participants. Our aim is to know who would 
engage in water scarcity conflicts. Thus we seek an answer to our second question: What is the profile 
of those that respond to water scarcity with conflictive appropriation?  Does the profile of those that 
enter into water scarcity conflict in the experiment confirm the hypotheses that people whom are most 
likely to join in conflict the poor, marginalized, dissocialized, with low human capital and with higher 
stakes? 
To link the likelihood of reacting to water scarcity by conflictive behavior, reducing appropriation, 
persisting in conflictive or in non-competitive behavior to irrigators’ individual characteristics we need 
to look at the change in appropriation behavior when water becomes scarce. Therefore, we estimate 
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the (log) odds of making selfish appropriation decisions in the experiment using a binary logistic 
regression. The independent variables are individual and household characteristics of the participating 
irrigators (table 2: descriptive statistics). To asses the effect of water scarcity on the likelihood of 
selfish appropriation decisions on participants with different characteristics we interact each of the 
independent variables with the treatment effect, i.e. the dummy variable ‘Scarcity’. This permits to 
calculate the likelihood of selfish appropriation behavior when water is abundant and when it is scarce 
(table 3). An irrigator with median characteristics can be used as a reference. This irrigator is a man 
who believes in fairness, has not experienced irrigation water shortages, is not a member of village 
government, does not belong to a minority religious group and lives in a food secure household with 
median wealth in terms of assets and landholding. His appropriation decisions are unsanctioned. The 
probability the reference irrigator makes a selfish appropriation decision when water is abundant (AB) 
in the experiment is pAB=.216. The probability he makes a selfish appropriation decision when water is 
scarce (SC) is pSC=.329 which is significantly higher9. Then the effect of the participants’ individual 
characteristics on these probabilities can be assessed.  
In the population of participating upstream users: Proportion   N 
Male 67.9%   78 
Foodinsec  41.0%   78 
Villgvt  42.3%   78 
Watershort  26.9%   78 
No_fair 24.4%   78 
Min_reli 30.8%   78 
Young 29.5%   78 
No_edu 19.7%   76 
Farmincome 23.4%   77 
Low_power 30.3%   76 
High_power 30.3%   76 
 Mean Median SD N 
Irrisize 1.365 1.000 1.048 72 
DevSQirrisize 1.037 .415 2.134 72 
Assets1 .045 -.370 1.110 72 
Assets2 .005 .232 1.027 72 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
In a second step we make the findings more concrete by calculating the effect of particular individual 
characteristics on the probability to react to water scarcity by conflictive appropriation, by reducing 
appropriation or by persisting in conflictive or in non-competitive appropriation. We do so by 
                                                     
9 With pAB=exp(∑(βiXi)/(1+exp(∑βiXi) and pSC=exp(∑(βiXi+γi(XixSc))/(1+exp(∑(βiXi+γi(XixSc)))). 
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multiplying the probability of (non)selfish behavior in water abundance with the probability of 
(non)selfish behavior in water scarcity based on the regression estimates. For instance, the probability 
that the reference irrigator reacts to water scarcity with conflictive behavior is calculated by (1-
pAB)xpSC and is .258 (table 4). His most likely reactions to water scarcity are persisting in non-
competitive behavior (.526). His reactions are less likely to consist of reducing appropriation (.145) 
and least likely to consist of persistent competition (.071). These probabilities can be calculated for 
irrigators with different characteristics.  
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log(P(selfish)/(1-P(selfish)) B S.E.a Sig B S.E.a Sig B S.E.a Sig B S.E.a Sig B S.E.a Sig 
Constant -2.147 0.545 *** -1.282 0.243 *** -1.327 0.229 *** -1.338 0.240 *** -1.209 0.319 ***  
Scarcity 1.309 0.532 *** 0.626 0.263 *** 0.420 0.225 ** 0.431 0.230 * 0.643 0.333 ** 
SanctionR_1 0.559 0.379 * 1.055 0.321 *** 0.945 0.339 *** 1.074 0.343 *** 1.101 0.325 *** 
ScarcityXSanctionR_1 0.935 0.422 *** 0.525 0.375 ^ 0.661 0.392 ** 0.516 0.390 ^ 0.498 0.372 ^ 
Male 0.641 0.453 ^                 
ScarcityXMale -0.732 0.461 *                 
Watershort -0.362 0.418                  
ScarcityXWatershort -0.020 0.409                  
Foodinsec -0.559 0.373 *                 
ScarcityXFoodinsec 0.852 0.417 ***                 
Assets1 -0.404 0.159 ***                 
ScarcityXAssets1 0.152 0.224                  
Assets2 -0.089 0.259                  
ScarcityXAssets2 -0.158 0.229                  
Irrisize -0.003 0.274                  
ScarcityXIrrisize -0.300 0.301                  
DevSQirrisize 0.165 0.120 ^                 
ScarcityXDevSQirrisize  0.032 0.130                  
No_fair 0.048 0.524                  
ScarcityXNo_fair 0.610 0.461 ^                 
Min_reli 1.256 0.505 ***                 
ScarcityXMin_reli -0.573 0.497                  
Villgvt 0.542 0.415 ^                 
ScarcityXVillgvt -0.521 0.416                  
Young     -0.269 0.363              
ScarcityXYoung     -0.106 0.359              
No_edu         -0.272 0.553          
ScarcityXNo_edu         0.837 0.605 ^         
Farmincome             -0.218 0.526      
ScarcityXFarmincome             0.739 0.545 ^     
Low_power                 -0.698 0.451 * 
ScarcityXLow_power                 0.552 0.487  
High_power                 0.035 0.443  
ScarcityXHigh_power                         -0.595 0.423 ^ 
Classification Pred.0 Pred.1 %cor Pred.0 Pred.1 %cor Pred.0 Pred.1 %cor Pred.0 Pred.1 %cor Pred.0 Pred.1 %corr
Obs. 0 527 114 82.2% 600 99 85.8% 595 96 86.1% 598 98 85.9% 586 97 85.8%
Obs.1 180 259 59.0% 244 227 48.2% 234 215 47.9% 240 219 47.7% 239 218 47.7%
Pseudo R Squares                     
Cox and Snell 0.213   0.149   0.149   0.149   0.155   
Nagelkerke 0.287   0.201   0.202   0.202   0.209   
McFadden 0.177     0.120     0.121     0.120     0.125     
Sample Design Information                     
Total N 1170   1170   1170   1170   1170   
Missing 90   0   30   15   30   
Strata 1   1   1   1   1   
Units 72   78   76   77   76   
Dependent variable = log odds of selfish water appropriation decision by upstream participant i in 
nd R       
a Corrected for clustering within individuals               
***95% **90% *85% ^80%                
 
 Table 3: Binary logistic regression estimating the likelihood of making selfish appropriation decisions when water is abundant and when it is 
scarce  
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We now evaluate the effect of sanctions and of specific individual characteristics on appropriation 
behavior. First, if the upstream user has been sanctioned by the downstream user, i.e. received 
dissatisfied reaction or a punishment, for her appropriation decision in the previous round, the 
upstream user's appropriation decision is likely to be affected. Therefore we included a dummy 
SanctionR_1 as a control variable10.  Contrary to expectations, if the upstream user was sanctioned in 
the previous round the likelihood of being selfish is significantly higher both when water is abundant 
and when it is scarce. Sanctioning provokes a counteraction rather than a correction of uncooperative 
behavior in the experiment, possibly because such adversarial reactions are unacceptable in these 
communities with a tradition of reconciliatory conflict settlement.  
Probability appropriation decision in reaction to water scarcity consists of: 
  
Conflictive 
reaction 
Permanently 
conflictive 
Reduce 
Permanently 
non-competitive 
Reference 0.258 0.071 0.145 0.526 
Effect of being female 0.305 0.044 0.082 0.568 
Effect of food insecurity 0.343 0.054 0.082 0.521 
Effect of more Assets1 (~Livestock)a 0.203 0.036 0.114 0.648 
Effect of more Assets2 (~Housing quality, transport)a 0.258 0.071 0.145 0.526 
Effect of larger irrigated plota 0.258 0.071 0.145 0.526 
Effect of larger squared deviation irrigated plota 0.295 0.116 0.166 0.423 
Effect of no belief in fairness 0.372 0.103 0.114 0.412 
Effect of membership of minority religion 0.321 0.311 0.181 0.187 
Effect of membership village government 0.310 0.147 0.174 0.368 
Effect of water shortage experience 0.258 0.071 0.145 0.526 
Reference = man, food secure, median assets1, median assets2, median irrigated plot size, median squared deviation irrigated plot size, 
belief in fairness, not member of minority religion, not member of village government, no water shortage experience, decisions are 
unsanctioned. 
a:Median+S.D. (see table 2)     
Table 4: The effect of different individual characteristics on the probability of reacting to water scarcity with conflictive 
appropriation, persisting in conflictive appropriation, reducing appropriation or persisting in non-competitive appropriation  
                                                     
10 Appropriation decisions are likely to be correlated within individuals and the downstream user's sanctioning behavior is a 
direct function of the upstream user's appropriation decision. One could thus argue that our models suffer from endogeneity 
problems similar to those encountered in dynamic panel data models. However, omitting the reaction of the downstream user 
in the previous round as an explanatory variable would induce an omitted variable bias. The standard solution to this problem 
to estimate the model in first differences and use suitably lagged levels of the endogenous variable as instruments (Bond 
2002). This, however, is uninteresting as this deletes all time invariant variables from the model, which are key in this study. 
Yet the first decision by the upstream user can be considered to be exogenous, since we use experimental data, which 
eliminates the problems mentioned above (Stewart 2006). Moreover, any endogeneity bias in panel data disappears as T goes 
to infinity. The data used here comprises of 15 rounds which makes any endogeneity bias negligible.  
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Secondly, gender (‘Male’) is expected to influence appropriation behavior in response to water 
scarcity because water values and community mechanisms to induce non-competitive appropriation 
behavior are different for men and women (Lecoutere et al. forthcoming). Moreover, the conflict 
literature associates a higher likelihood of conflictive behavior to men than to women. We observe that 
male participants are more likely to be selfish than women when water is abundant in the experiment. 
Yet, in reaction to water scarcity their likelihood to be selfish increases less than for women. Thus, 
while men are more competitive from the start, women are more likely to react with conflictive 
behavior to water scarcity than men (=.305). Water may be more valuable to women for reasons of 
subsistence or they may anticipate of being allowed a larger share by the community to provide for 
pressing needs (Lecoutere et al., forthcoming). 
Thirdly, the literature suggests the poor and uneducated are more likely to exhibit conflictive behavior. 
As a first indicator of poverty we included the dummy variable ‘Foodinsec’, which indicates that the 
participant’s household has experienced food insecurity in the two years preceding the survey. Lack of 
education (‘No_edu’) is another indicator for poverty11. We find that poor participants are less likely 
than others to make selfish appropriation decisions when water is abundant but more likely to make 
selfish appropriation decisions when water is scarce. Both poverty indicators, food insecurity and lack 
of education, confirm this12. Possibly, if resources are abundant the poor abide strongly with non-
competition norms because their vulnerable position makes them highly susceptible to social pressure. 
But if resources such as water, which are probably vital for subsistence, are scarce the poor will enter 
into competition (Lecoutere et al. forthcoming). As a result and in line with expectations, the 
probability that the poor react with conflictive behavior to water scarcity is higher than for others (e.g. 
=.343 for food insecure participants).  
Oppositely, wealth is expected to negatively affect conflictive behavior. Assets owned by the 
participants’ household are an indication of wealth. The first wealth indicator represents mainly 
                                                     
11 Lack of education is possitively correlated with food insecurity and with agriculture as the sole income. It is negatively 
correlated with all asset indicators. 
12 Having only income out of agriculture, which also relates to poverty, confirms this relation. 
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household’s wealth in livestock (‘Assets1’), the second mainly housing quality and ownership of 
transport means (‘Assets2’)13. Other (relative) wealth indicators are the size of irrigated land and its 
(squared) deviation with the irrigation scheme’s average (‘Irrisize’; ‘DevSQirrisize’). We do not 
however observe a great impact of wealth on appropriation behavior in abundance. The livestock 
wealth indicator negatively affects the likelihood of selfish appropriation in water abundance. A larger 
deviation from the irrigation scheme’s average increases the likelihood of selfish appropriation 
decisions in abundance. Possibly it reduces incentives for cooperative behavior but not necessarily as a 
result of scarcity. Actually, wealth does not seem to affect appropriation behavior when water 
becomes scarce.  
Fourthly, marginalization, a low degree of social ties and a weaker adherence to fairness norms are 
expected to enhance conflictive behavior in response to resource scarcity because social pressure and 
the deterrence effect of non-competition norms are reduced (Hayami 2009). A measure for lack of 
individual belief in fairness is based on the General Social Survey (GSS) question on fairness 
(‘No_fair’): "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
would they try to be fair?" (Karlan 2005:20)14. We observe that participants who lack belief in fairness 
are more likely to appropriate in a selfish way but only when water is scarce. This increases the 
likelihood that these participants react with conflictive behavior to water scarcity (=.372).  
As an indicator of a low degree of social ties in the community we constructed dummy variables 
indicating membership of a religious group or tribe that includes less than one third of the irrigation 
schemes’ population (‘Min_reli’; ‘Min_tribe’) since social ties often coincide with religion or tribe in 
rural Tanzania. Additionally, minority religious groups and tribes suffer from unequal access to 
resources and power in the irrigation schemes (see discussion). Such exclusion from economic or 
                                                     
13 We reduced information on seven different assets i.e. size of total landholding, size of irrigated plots, number of cows, 
whether the house is built with bricks, whether the house has an iron roof or roof tiles, ownership of bicycle and livestock 
value to two uncorrelated principal components. These explain 60% of the variability in the original seven variables. Both 
components are uncorrelated with landholding. (Livestock value is the total value of big and small livestock calculated using 
marketvalues at the time of the survey (www.lmistz.net and market prices recorded in Mufindi district, July 2008). 
14 Respondents expressed belief in fairness by referring to a scale going from low over moderate to high levels of fairness. 
Below moderate levels are taken as an indication of not believing in fairness.  
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political opportunities may frustrate people and may create incentives for more conflictive behavior 
(Stewart 2000). We find that members of a minority religion are much more likely to make selfish 
appropriation decisions when water is abundant15. When water is scarce the likelihood of making 
selfish decisions rises as much as it does for others. Their reactions to water scarcity consist mainly of 
persisting or entering in competition. Irrigators with low degrees of social ties are more likely to 
exhibit conflictive appropriation behavior but not necessarily as a response to resource scarcity.  
Fifthly, if stakes are higher we expect more conflictive behavior in response to water scarcity. The 
(relative) importance and value of irrigation water is expected to be higher if participants experienced 
irrigation water shortage in any one of the two dry seasons preceding the survey, if agriculture is their 
only source of income and if the percentage of irrigated land allocated to cash crops is larger (resp. 
‘Watershort’; ‘Farmincome’)16. The percentage of irrigated land allocated to cash crops did not have a 
significant effect on appropriation behavior and was dropped because of correlations with other 
variables. Possibly, irrigation water is equally highly valued by commercially oriented farmers as it is 
by subsistence farmers. Unexpectedly, our results show that having experienced water shortages does 
not make participants appropriate in a more selfish way, not even when water is scarce. Either this 
experience has not raised the value they allot to water, or they have learned not to respond with selfish 
behavior. But when participants only gain an income out of agriculture and irrigation water is of great 
importance for their livelihood, we observe an increased likelihood of selfish appropriation when 
water is scarce. Consequently, these participants are more likely to respond with conflictive behavior 
to water scarcity than others.  
Sixthly, while youngster are assumed to be more inclined to conflictive behavior, we do not observe a 
higher likelihood of selfish appropriation by relatively young participants when water is abundant nor 
when it is scarce (‘Young’ indicates the participant is (more than) seven years younger than the 
                                                     
15 We did not observe the same effect when participants are member of minority tribes, probably because at present religion 
binds people more than tribe in rural Tanzania (Toner 2008). 
16 Only gaining an income out of agriculture is also associated to poverty.  
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irrigation scheme’s average)17.  Possibly young people are more susceptible to social pressure to avoid 
competition in these communities.  
Lastly, a political ecology perspective requires taking into account patterns of power and dependency 
that may influence irrigators’ appropriation behavior. While the more powerful members of society 
may take advantage of their position and compete over scarce resources, the less powerful may be 
more careful in competing with others. Yet if powerlessness coincides with poverty or results from 
processes of exclusion, it may increase the likelihood of conflictive appropriation over scarce but vital 
resources. A relatively low (high) power status points to a relative power status that is more than -.14 
lower (.16 higher) than the average in the irrigation community (‘Low_power’; ‘High_power’)18. 
Membership of village government is another more direct measure for (decision making) power 
(‘Villgvt’).  
We observe that participants with a relatively low power status are less likely to make selfish 
appropriation decisions when water is abundant than others19. When water is scarce their appropriation 
behavior is not significantly different. It follows that low power status people are more likely to react 
with conflictive behavior to water scarcity. On the one hand, a low power status may imply a 
vulnerable position in the community and force people to comply with non-competition norms. On the 
other hand, a low power status is also related to poverty. When water is scarce, the need to secure 
sufficient water for subsistence may therefore annul the (social) pressure to comply with norms. 
Oppositely and contrary to expectations, more powerful irrigators are not more inclined to compete 
over scarce resources than others16. In fact, they are more likely to react to water scarcity by reducing 
appropriation. This can be due to two reasons: their high power status may relate to wealth and 
therefore they do not need to secure a sufficient share of scarce resources. Or their higher power status 
encourages them to exhibit exemplary behavior. But a position in village government creates more 
                                                     
17 Included separately to avoid multicollinarity. 
18 Relational patterns did not affect behavior in the experiment in a direct way as participants however were uninformed 
about their counterpart. The internalized awareness of one’s relative position in the community however influences behavior 
in the experiment (Cardenas 2003). The variables are included separately to avoid multicollinarity. 
19 Others whom power status diverges less than -.14 and less than +.16 from the irrigation site’s average power status.  
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incentives for conflictive behavior in abundance. When water is scarce the likelihood of selfishness 
increases as much as it does for others.  
By conclusion, the answer to our second question: Are those who are most likely to enter into conflict 
over scarce resources the poor, marginalized, dissocialized, with low human capital and with higher 
stakes? Yes, they are. The poor, the uneducated and those with an income only out of agriculture – 
whom stakes in irrigation water are higher - are more likely than others to react with conflictive 
appropriation to resource scarcity in the experiment. Those that adhere less strongly to fairness norms 
also show a higher likelihood of conflictive reactions to resource scarcity. Marginalized irrigators with 
limited social ties behave in a more conflictive way as well but not necessarily as a reaction to 
resource scarcity. Yet, our observations also contradict some assumptions. In fact, male irrigators, 
young irrigators, irrigators who allot a high (commercial) value to water and powerful irrigator are not 
more likely than others to engage in conflict over scarce resources.   
Discussion  
In the previous section, we presented behavioral evidence of who is likely to engage in resource 
scarcity conflicts. We assume these may be the ones that are more easily convinced to join in more 
violent ways of competing for scarce resources in reality. The relation between resource scarcity and 
conflict however is complex and multilayered. That is why we will evaluate our findings in political 
ecology perspective and evaluate to what extent other factors conducive to resource scarcity conflict 
are present in Tanzania.  
First, existing conflicting pressures between different users of Tanzania’s water resources – such as 
domestic users, farmers, livestock keepers, industry and  hydropower plants - may well exacerbate by 
climate change and increasing climate variability which have made rainfall more erratic (Maganga et 
al. 2002, Paavola 2008, Sokoni and Shechambo 2005). Within the small-scale irrigation sector, 
competition over water is ever increasing. Irrigated agriculture has become more attractive because 
rain-fed agriculture has become riskier and because it has gained importance for production of locally 
marketable crops, like tomatoes and onions (Kaswamila and Masuruli 2004, Shao et al. 2002).  
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Secondly, water governance institutions in Tanzania entail potential marginalizing and exclusionary 
features which could contribute to conflicts over (increasingly) scarce resources. Despite the National 
Water Policy’s good intentions, its arguments to use water in the most efficient and sustainable way 
and the principle of treating water as an economic good can endanger the entitlement to water of small 
scale users (URT 2002)20. Participation of small scale users at basin level water resource management 
is questionable. Moreover, small scale users are likely to pull the shortest string if competition over 
water arises since mostly they do not hold an official water right. At the level of the smallholder 
irrigation schemes, water use is largely regulated by more informal institutions but often elements of 
formal institutions are blended in. The flexible and pragmatic nature of these (blends of) institutions 
allows accommodating for different challenges posed by water appropriation and has aided to avoid 
disruptive and violent resource conflicts. But processes of marginalization and exclusion are at work. 
If distributive conflicts arise, low power status and female irrigators do not always have the capability 
or forsake their capability to engage in creative conflict solving and often they do not uphold their 
interests (Lecoutere 2010). 
Thirdly, horizontal inequalities, marginalization of certain groups and their exclusion from access to 
resources are other factors that are conducive to resource scarcity conflicts.  Such inequalities in 
wealth, power and resource access could aid mobilization for (resource scarcity) conflicts, especially 
when a higher likelihood for conflictive water appropriation concurs with such inequalities. 
The poor – those who have no education, only gain income out of agriculture and experienced food 
insecurity – exhibited a higher likelihood to enter into conflict over scarce resources in the experiment 
and in reality they are marginalized with regard to water and land access and (decision making) 
power21. Both at the irrigation schemes level and the regional level, the poor report significantly more 
                                                     
20 NAWAPO serves as the reference even while it has not been fully incorporated into legislation yet.  
21 To check for inequalities at the irrigation scheme level, we use the survey sample here and we check for correlations in 
each of the five irrigation schemes (N=228). Note that these variables were not significantly correlated in the sample of 
experiment participants we used for the logistic regression.  
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problems of water shortage22.  The poor have smaller landholdings and a lower proportion owns their 
land, while the wealthy have significantly larger (irrigated) landholdings 23 . Moreover, poverty 
negatively correlates with relative power status in the irrigator community, while wealth positively 
correlates with it. There is a significantly lower proportion of village government members among the 
poor and a higher proportion among the wealthy in the irrigation schemes.  
Next, there is experimental evidence that members of minority religious groups are more inclined to 
conflictive appropriation both when water is abundant and when it is scarce. Besides, mobilization to 
join in (resource scarcity) conflicts is most effective if inequalities in economic opportunities, resource 
access or political participation coincide with cultural, ethnic or religious differences (Stewart 2000). 
Such inequalities are present in the studied irrigation schemes. Actually, members of minority 
religions and members of minority tribes report significantly more water shortage problems. But in 
some irrigation schemes they can be considered wealthier in terms of livestock and housing quality. 
Members of minority tribes, however, have smaller (irrigated) landholdings in some irrigation 
schemes.  
While we did not observe differences in reactions to water scarcity in the experiment between youth 
and older irrigators, between (traditional) government members and others, between lifetime residents 
and those who immigrated to the village, inequalities in wealth, water and land access and (decision 
making) power exist along these lines. While young irrigators are less wealthy in terms of livestock 
and housing quality, they have smaller landholdings and less own their land24. These relations with are 
confirmed at the regional level, except for housing quality. There is a significantly lower proportion of 
village government members among the young. Probably a persistent cultural fact that reserves 
leadership for men of certain age deprives the young (and women) of the capability to participate in 
                                                     
22 Definition of water shortage problems at the irrigation scheme: too little water for farming in the irrigation scheme in any 
of the two dry seasons preceding the survey. At the regional level: drought was the main reason for a difference between the 
total area planted and harvested (irrigated or not).  
23 The wealthy are those who own cows, own a house built with bricks or iron roofing or have a higher than average asset 
holding in terms of livestock, housing quality and transport means.  
24 Plot division at heritage is probably one of the causes of problematic land access for youth involved in agriculture. 
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decision making. Furthermore, irrigators whom are member of village government are generally 
wealthier in terms of livestock and housing quality and they have larger landholdings. Lifetime 
residents however do not seem privileged. There is no relation to wealth, government membership, 
water or land access.  
By conclusion we answer the third research question: viewed from a political ecology perspective, are 
circumstances in Tanzania such that resource scarcity could engender conflict? Yes, they are. Water 
scarcity is expected to increase. At the same time commercialization of irrigated agriculture raises the 
value of water. De facto, water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements. Additionally, 
those who are more inclined to conflictive water appropriation in reaction to water scarcity in the 
experiment – the poor, the marginalized and the dissocialized – suffer from real economic and political 
inequalities. Such inequalities could form a basis for mobilization for more violent ways of competing 
for scarce resources.   
Still, we do not want to raise suspicion that the poor and the marginalized will soon engage in resource 
scarcity conflicts in Tanzania. To date there have been few incidences of disruptive or violent resource 
scarcity conflicts in Tanzania. The relatively well functioning water governance institutions with good 
intentions and the strong egalitarian and peace minded norms in Tanzania reduce the threat of resource 
scarcity conflicts. Yet, the rising competition over scarcer water resources, the exclusionary features of 
water governance institutions and the concurrence of real economic and political marginalization with 
a higher likelihood of conflictive water appropriation in response to scarcity could be conducive to 
resource scarcity conflicts. Therefore, care should be taken and policy measures should ease these 
factors conducive to water scarcity conflicts.  
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